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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ALAN C. THO.MSON, ERNEST L.
WILKINSON and SIDNEY 1\1.
HORMAN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

NICK J. CONDAS, CHRIS J.
CONDAS, MARY CONDAS LEHMER, ELLEN CONDAS BAYAS
and ALEXANDRA C 0 ND A S
OCKEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12458

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
STATE.MENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case was filed by the Plaintiff, who seeks
to establish that a right-of-way exists from state highway 248 across the extreme south of Defendants' land
(Lot 2 and the SW
of the NE
of Section 5,
Range 4 East, Township 2 South, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian to land belonging to Plaintiffs in Section 5,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East and Section 33 Town-

*

*
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ship 1 South Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
.l\Ieridian. All located in Summit County, Utah.
Plaintiffs claim a right-of-way based upon public
use for a period in excess of ten years and a dedication
by Federal Government according to Statute.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found no public user in the specifically described right-of-way and found for the Defendants, no cause of action. The lower court also
found no public user in the "lower road."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs maintain that there has been a con·
tinuous and uninterrupted ingress and egress into Plain·
tiffs' property either over the lower road or the upper '
or quarry road since at least as early as 1894, and that
such use established an easement in Plaintiffs' pre·
decessors in Title and in the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs
appeal from the findings and conclusions as not con·
forming to the evidence. Plaintiffs seek a reversal of
the lower court and to have the case rewarded for additional evidence describing a right-of-way over the
"lower road."
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STATE.M:ENT OF FACTS
In 1894 there was an operating quarry on the
"quarry mountain" called the Metropolitan Quarry
(R 333) and stone was being shipped by railroad. The
Superintendent of l\fetropolitan Stone married a sister
of witness Vernon Snyder, and they visited back and
forth frequently (R 334). There was a wagon road
that went below and up into the quarry area (R 335)
(Center of SE % of NE % of Section 5) where buildings were located during the operation of the quarry
(R 335). Witness's sister and husband lived in a cottage
near the other buildings. There was also a large bunkhouse used for laborers at the quarry to make their beds
in; there was a stable for horses and a blacksmith shop;
perhaps an ice house. All the buildings were frame except the boarding house ( R 335) . Witness and family
visited married sister frequently at the quarry using
horses and horse drawn vehicles (R 337). On these
visits the witness and his family followed the lower
road (R 337). 'Vitness lived with his sister at the
quarry when she was anticipating confinement for birth
of a baby ( R 338). There was quite a group of men
working there-between fifteen and twenty at the time
( R 338) . There were Chinese cooks who slept at the
boarding house and workers who slept at the bunkhouse
(R 338). There were two Chinese cooks, a Superintendent and his wife, and workers-possibly twenty-five
people ( R 339) .
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A l\Ir. Custer operated the quarry later (R 340).
During this time there was no fence or obstruction to
the road (R 342). For a time after closing the quarry,
a family named Garn lived in the bunkhouse. There was
no way for them to get in and out except by use of the
lower roadway ( R 343) .
When the quarry closed down, Vernon Snyder's
brother bought pigs and drove them down the road
(R 345). Snyder stated the lower road was the only
service road he knew of (R 345) .
At one time there were as many as two hundred
men working in the quarry (R 97). The lower road
was used as ingress and egress to the quarry between
1915 and 1920 (R 179 and 184).
When the Condas family first went on the property
in 1928 and 1929, the "upper" or quarry road did not
exist except as an old railroad grade-"kind of a scar
on the hill" ( R 11) . The lower road was there in 1929
( R 11) . There had been a railroad serving the quarry,
and it was removed sometime between 1924 and 1926
(R 128). The lower road was used by Condas in 1927.
The railroad grade was gradually made useable for vehicular traffic (R 329 and 13).
Hugh Balser, a Manager for Bamberger Com·
pany, testified that in 1926 there was ingress and egress
on the old railroad grade and the County road through
the lower part (R 104). Also, there was a bunkhouse
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and repair sheds. Egress from the bunkhouse was on
the "County road" (R 105). He also testified that
Exhibit P 5 represented features on the land and the
lower road as shown on the map. 1'1Iarcellen stated that
he had seen people down "in here go squirrel hunting,
fishing and things like that (R 215).
Chris Condas testified that the lower road ran to
a "bunch of buildings" ( R 268). Gerald Hanley used
the lower road ( R 27 4) . Gerald Hanley used lower
road and _Mills road (R 282). He also saw a number of
cars parked along lower road (R 283). William P. Sullivan stated that he saw the lower road being used at
times (R 291).
Condas built a fence along the west side of their
property in 1929 ( R 22) to comply with homestead requirements. The fense had a stock gate. After patent
was granted, neither the fence nor the gate was seriously maintained (R 30).
Beginning in 1934, a chain was placed across the
developing upper road by the Plaintiffs' predecessors
in title to preclude stone theft. The chain was maintained until 1958 or 1959 by the various lessees of the
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest.
In 1958 or 1959, the chain was moved to a point on
the Plaintiffs' predecessors property. Between that time
and the present, there has been no restriction to use of
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the upper road except the barricade erected in 1967 by
the Defendants.
Between 1929 and the present, the use of the lower
road has declined and the use of the quarry or upper
road has increased. Sheep herds have gone in and out,
using the lower road and the upper quarry road (R 326).
Up until the last year or two (R 326 and 327) both the
lower road and the upper quarry road have been used
for this purpose.
Since the property was acquired by the Plaintiffs,
the chain has not been maintained on the quarry road.
.Some use of the lower road has continued to the present
time.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THERE WAS A PUBLIC USE
OF THE LOWER ROAD.
Without being repetitious in citing the testimony
upon which this case is based, it appears that the fol·
lowing facts are developed and not controverted in
testimony:
A. That from 1894 to the present, there has been
in existence a lower road leading to the center of Sec·
tion 5, Township 2 South.
B.

That the lower road was the service road for
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a community of at least twenty persons in 1894, and
that at one time serviced the quarry community and the
employment of two hundred men. People went in and
out on visits, to bring in food, to drive out pigs and no
other known access was testified to.

C. As long as the railroad remained ( 1924) the
lower road served as ingress and egress for the quarry
and the lower road was used for sheep trailing as late
as 1931 and 1932. The lower road continues to be used
by the public and there is no obstruction of that road
on the Defendants' property.
It would appear that in 1894 and for some years
thereafter the area served by the lower road was a mining community, and even after Metropolitan Stone
Company stopped operating the quarry, the lower road
serviced the quarry area for employees and workman.
(The stone was being removed by railroad).
It would appear that the rights established back as
far as 1894 are such that if the quarry expanded its
production, it would (by the peadings) be entitled to
use the upper road for transportation of stone (changed
from railroad to truck) and for use of the lower road,
for all supportive quarry services including residential
community. This appears to be established by the evidence.
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POINT II
THE USE OF BOTH THE UPPER QUARRY ROAD AND THE LOWER ROAD WAS
ESTABLISIIED FOR A P E R I 0 D OF
THIRTY-NINE YEARS PRIOR TO PATENT
(SEE STATEl\IENT OF FACTS) AND CONSTITUTED A PUBLIC USER AND DEDICATION.
Title 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
Amended states:
A highway shall be deemed to have been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as
a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
(Repeated identically worded Section contained in the laws of 1880 and laws of 1886,
Chapter 12, Section 2.)
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended, also
states 27-12-90:
All public highways once established shall
continue to be highways until abandoned or
vacated by order of the highway authorities
having jurisdiction over such highway or by
other competent authority. Also, revised
statutes 1898, Section 1116.
United States Code Annotated, 1953, Chapter 43,
Section 932 states:
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the right-of-way for the construction of
highways over public lands not reserved for
public use is hereby granted.
The uncontroverted evidence in this case indicates
that the lower road was used from 1894 up through
1933, and the use was such as to support a dedication
of the public highway and as such the lower road would
be exempt from any patent granted to the Defendants.
In United States versus 9,947.71 acres of land,
220 Federal Supplement, 328, the Court stated:
Where owners of valid mining claim built
access road over public domain in accordance
with local custom, Title to right-of-way vested
in mining claim owners and subsequent toll
road and eminent domain proceedings did not
diminsh rights of owners to right-of-way so far
as the United States was concerned.
In Oregon Short-line Railway Company versus
Murray City, 1954, 277 Pacific 2nd 798 2 Utah 2nd
427, the Court stated:
This action was intended to grant an easement and the railroad could not acquire title
to property thereunder.
In 80 Pacific 267 37 Wa. 682, the Court stated:
This section is a grant in praesenti and
when accepted by the public it took effect as
of the date of the grant.
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The Utah Court in Lindsay Land and Livestock
Company versus Churnos, 75 Utha 384, 285 P. 646
stated:
Use of road over public lands belonging
to Federal Government as public thoroughfare
for eighteen years, a time in excess of that required by law, ( 1880 Chapter 29, Sec. 2 and
1886 Chapter 12 Section 2) for creation of a
public highway held sufficient in law to amount
to acceptance of a grant of right-of-way over
public lands, and therefore constituted road a
public highway by dedication.
Perhaps the case most in point in the Utah State
is the case of Sullivan versus Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290
P. 954. This case is particularly interesting since it involves predecessors in interest to Condas, one of the
parties in this case, and to Sullivan, one of the witnesses in the case. In the Sullivan versus Condas case,
Sullivan sought to enjoin the tresspass of Condas over
an alleged private roadway or right-of-way. The Plain·
tiff in that case alleged that the right-of-way was a
public highway, and that such for more than sixty years
had been continuously used by the Defendant, his
predecessors in interest and the public generally with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the Plaintiffs and
their predecessors until shortly before the commence·
ment of the action. He further alleged that the roadway
was the only means of ingress and egress to and from
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the Defendant's premises on which valuable improvements had been made. The Court goes on to state that
there was evidence that as early as 1873, the roadway
extended up and down the canyon over the lands owned
by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and others, while
such lands were part of the public domain, it was
traveled and used by the public .
. . . the patent to a land issued, the predecessors
in interest of the Plaintiffs was issued in
1906, about 33 years thereafter. The rightof-way having been established over public
lands by public user, the predecessors of the
Plaintiffs when the patent was issued to them,
and the Plaintiffs when they acquired their
interest in and to the land took them subject
to an easement in favor of the public unless it
was thereafter extinguished by operation of
state law.
This case appears to have a distinct parallel in the
present case.
The lower road was in use from 1894 to 1933, a
period of 39 years prior to the granting of a patent to
Condas. An easement and right-of-way had been
established for a period of 39 years prior to the patent
and the patent was therefore excepted the public highway established therein since no statutory action has
been taken to abandon the highway use.
There seems to be only the question of quantitative
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evidence. How much and how great a use makes a property a public road. 'V"ould the travel of one thousand
employees to a mining camp constitute a public use.
Would the travel of 200 employees such as testified to
in this case constitute a public use. Plaintiff maintains
that a public user was established by competent evidence
and respectfully requests that the case be remanded to
the Trial Court for the determination of a description
and width of the public highway.

Respectfully submitted,
Lorin N. Pace

Attorney for Plaintiffs
431 South Third East

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

